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This paper analyzes two possible sources of low-development traps related to human capital 
accumulation. The first one comes from a mismatch between the skills workers have acquired 
through their formal education and the skills demanded by some non-in vative firms in the labor 
market.  The second one comes from segmentation in the educational system, such that the 
children of better educated parents receive a higher quality education than the children of less 
educated parents. Two different models are presented in which each of t ese sources cause, 
correspondingly, dual economies and low-development traps. 
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Since the early economic development theory (such as Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943), the idea of 
poverty or low-development traps has been present either implicitly or explicitly. The essential 
-reinforcing mechanisms that cause poverty 
to persist (Azariadis and Starchuski, 2005; Kraay and McKenzie, 2014). The notion of poverty 
as well as the existence of polarized groups of households within countries: rich vs. poor.  As 
emphasized by Kraay and Mc Kenzie (2014), the implication of the existence of poverty traps is 
that one-time policy efforts that break the poverty trap may have long-lasting effects. 
 
Typically poverty trap models rely on some departure form the neoclassical assumptions, which 
may be scale economies, positive externalities, increasing returns in the modern sector of the 
economy vs. constant returns in the traditional sector, imperfect competition, borrowing 
constraints, nutritional poverty traps, corrupted or weak institutional frameworks and 
geographical poverty traps.
1
 More recently, some behavioral poverty trap mechanisms have also 
-
today and income in the future (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011), and therefore the emergence of 
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  Geographical poverty traps refer to households in remote and isolated (rural) areas being unable to 
choose a better production technology simply because it is not available. The idea is that a similar 
get out of poverty.  
 
 3 
multiple equilibria, at high and low income levels, so that if an economy ( r a household) starts 
below a certain threshold,  
 
There is a vast literature on poverty traps models.
2
 This includes the model by Murphy, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1989) and Matsuyama (1995), in which multiple equilibria are generated by 
complementarities in investment decisions in physical capital; Gali (1995) in turn analyses the 
emergence of a low development trap in a environment of imperfect competition in which the 
size of markups decreases with the capital stock and the marginal product of capital and the real 
interest rate does not decrease with the capital stock.  
 
Noteworthy, in terms of growth determinants, Nelson and Phelps (1966) consider that it is the 
stock of human capital what leads to growth, since it affects the ability to innovate, whereas 
Lucas (1988) considers that it is the accumulation of human capital, the factor that leads to 
growth.
3
 Naturally, poverty trap models based on human capital accumulation have also been 
proposed, as it is the case of Kremer (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Barham et al. (1995), 
Redding (1996), Acemoglu (1997), Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Berti Ceroni (2001). Some of 
these models emphasize complementarities between different investment decisions; others 
emphasize the decision of human capital accumulation in a context of credit constraints. In turn, 
the models by Accinelli, Brida and London (2007), and Heymann, Galiani, Dabus and Thome 
(2006) find the growth process to require the achievement of threshold levels in human capital 
alongside thresholds in other economic variables. This seems to be in line with e development 
path followed by some Latin American countries such as Argentina. It also coincides with 
empirical evidence by Azariadis and Drazen (1990), who find that in a sample of 29 countries, no 
country with a low ratio of literacy to GDP was able to grow quickly in the period 1960-80 and 
Ros (2003), who shows evidence that even high initial levels of education are not a sufficient 




In Ikegami et al (2016) model individuals are endowed with different levels of innate ability 
and stock of capital, have to choose between two alternative technologies for generating income 
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 For a very complete review, see Azariadis and Starchuski (2005); for a more succinct yet more recent 
critical assessment, see Kraay and McKenzie (2014). Banerjee and Duflo (2011) provide an insightful and 




 Other related evidence can be found in Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000), and Krueger and Lindahl (2001), 
among others. 
 4 
and face missing financial markets.
5
 In this setting, low ability households remain poor because 
they never find the high-return technology attractive. Intermediate ability households can either 
end up chronically poor or may take up the high-return technology and move out of poverty, 
depending on their initial ability and assets endowments. Finally, individuals above both the 
critical level of assets and ability will always be non-poor.
6
 Pugliese et al (2017) offer a novel 
perspective; they argue and show empirical evidence that countries that have a higher number 
and/or cts, can start 
their industrialisation process at lower levels of GDP per capita.
7
 On the contrary, countries with 
poorly diversified economies cannot take off until they have reached an extremely high level of
capital. 
 
Laajaj (2017) models a behavioural poverty trap in which currently poor individuals foresee an 
unfavourable future of poverty and this induces them to reduce their time horizon, which in turn 
leads to a lower accumulation of assets, reinforcing their poverty condition.
8
 Dalton et al (2016) 
model the way in which an aspirations failure can lead to a poverty trap. A  
level can spur greater effort but it can also produce a low satisfaction from a particular outcome. 
If individuals take aspirations as given when choosing effort, that is, if ndividuals fail to 
internalise the feedback from effort to aspirations, they will end up in a low-wealth, low-
aspirations, low-effort trap.   
 
While there have been numerous and diverse proposed models on poverty trap mechanisms, 
empirical work on the prevalence of poverty traps has grown at a lower rate. This is no surprise 
given that an strict assessment and testing of poverty traps requires either panel data or 
randomized control trials followed over some reasonable period of time, and these kind of data is 
not abundant. In their assessment of the available empirical evidence on poverty traps, Kraay and 
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 Both technologies are capital using and skill-intensive but the high-technology is subject to a fixed cost, 
such that it is not worth using at low levels of capital. 
6
 This model is particularly thought-provoking because, when the authors introduce the possibility of 
households experiencing a shock, they conclude that shocks (even ex-ante, i.e. if not materialised) have 
more dramatic effects on i dividuals of intermediate ability: the possibility of a shock can set them on a 
different accumulation path, moving them to the low-equilibrium track. In this context, the authors 
conclude (after a simulation exercise) that c sh transfer programs that prioritise the vulnerable over the 
chronically poor may be preferable to programs focused on the chronically poor, in the sense that the first 
design reduces more the mid-term poverty rate (although it increases the short term one).
7
 The degree of country fitness is measured by the structure of exports in terms of their diversification and 
complexity of the manufacturing process. 
8
 The author offers supportive empirical evidence from an agro-input subsidy program and a matched 
savings program implemented in Mozambique, under a randomized controlled trial. Improvements in 
economic prospects increased the time horizon of poor beneficiaries and their asset accumulation over the 
two years after the intervention. 
 5 
McKenzie (2014) remain skeptical because there is no conclusive e idence for many of the 
common poverty-trap causing mechanisms considered in theoretical models, although evidence 
seems more conclusive in supporting behavioural and geographical poverty traps.
.9
 However, as 
these authors acknowledge, the mixed evidence on poverty traps does not invalidate these 
models. On the one hand, poverty trap mechanisms have usually been tested in isolation while in 
reality it is likely that more than one reinforcing mechanism is at work. Second, even if 
households or countries are not in a poverty trap, they may be converging to a steady state only at 
a very slow rate (Kraay and McKenzie, 2014, p145); thus aid programs can be justified. Surely, 
more work is required on this front and advances in data availability will enable that. 
 
In this paper, two sources of poverty traps are explored, building upon previous models. Both 
sources are related to the accumulation of human capital. In one of the models, which builds on 
Redding (1996) as well as on London et al. (2008), there is a complementarity between 
investments in research and development by firms and investments in human capital by workers 
in a context of heterogeneous firms in which there are innovative and non-innovative firms. 
When workers are matched to non-in ovative firms, they are requested to perform tasks unrelated 
to or too easy for their training; thus they experience a human capital loss, named here a - ffect.  
In the other model, previously introduced by Santos (2011), there is a segmented educational 
system, such that the children of better educated parents receive a sensible higher quality 
education than the children of less educated parents, also provoking a human capital loss among 
disadvantaged children, called here a -effect. The -effect can be framed in Nelson and Phelps 
abilities and the demanded abilities by the labor market, which in turn, affects the innovation 
effort performed by firms. On the other hand, the -effect 
perspective, since it addresses a problem in the process of human capital accumulation, such that 
it produces a high degree of heterogeneity or polarization in cognitive skills acquisition among 
different groups of society. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an endogenous growth model in 
which the existence of innovative and non-innovative firms together with a potential human 
capital loss effect discourages human capital investment and increases the chances of a dual 
                                                 
9
 These mechanisms include savings-based poverty traps, increasing returns to scale in the modern sector, 
nutritional poverty traps, and poverty traps arising from the interaction between borrowing constraints and 
a non-convex production technology. 
 6 
equilibrium. Section 3 presents a poverty-trap model in which the existence of another kind of 
human capital loss effect, related in this case to a l w quality education, the -effect, leads the 
fraction of the population that starts with a level of human capital below a certain threshold to 
remain there forever, driving the economy to a lower aggregate income per capita. Finally, 
Section 5 highlights some links across the two models as well as with previous literature and 
presents the concluding remarks. 
2 Simple growth model I: firms heterogeneity and the -effect as sources of a low-
development trap 
This model builds upon Redding (1996) , in which an economy's deficiencies in 
education and training are intimately related to firms' investments in product quality, in the form 
of profit-seeking Research and Development (R+D hereafter). It also builds upon a previous 
version by London (2007) and London et al. (2008). The model consists of a continuum of non-
overlapping generations of workers and entrepreneurs living for two periods, an  these are 
matched one-to-one in both periods of life.  
 
The main difference between Re e presented here is as follows. Redding 
assumes firms to be homogeneous in the first period, that is, all use the same technology, but 
some invest in R+D for the second period with some probability of success, while others do not. 
In this model on the contrary, firms are heterogeneous even in the first period: there are 
innovative and non-innovative firms, and thus they use two different technologies in the first 
period. The innovative firms invest in R+D for the second period, again with an associated 
probability of success. Workers are randomly assigned to innovative and non-innovative firms in 
both periods of life, and the allocation in the second time period is independent of the first one. 
However, the second difference is that if workers are assigned to non-innovative firms in their 
second period of life, they experience a human capital loss, named as a -effect, because despite 
having invested in human capital they end up employed in a firm that demands less qualifications 
and skills than the ones they owe. 
 
2.1 The model 
The model assumes a closed economy, with no government, composed of entrepreneurs (or 
firms) and workers, both in a continuum of non-overlapping generations; with each generation of 
workers and entrepreneurs living for 2 periods.  
The lifetime utility of generation  is given by: 
 7 
    (2.1)
10
 
where  is the consumption of generation  in period , and
 
is the time discount factor, with 
. It is assumed that individuals are risk neutral and that there is no human capital 
depreciation. As in Redding (1996)s model, individuals inherit or are born with one unit of 
human capital  (from investment in human capital of the preceding generation), and invest a 
fraction of their time in period 1 to increase this human capital stock.
11
 Then: 
   (2.2) 
where  is a parameter of efficiency of the educational system, with , and  is the human 
capital accumulation intensity, with . Parameters  and  represent the social and 
institutional conditions of the conomy, correspondingly. Equation (2.2) indicates that the human 
capital in the second period of life of each generation depends on the fraction of time devoted to 





The economy produces one homogeneous final good. 
there are two kinds of firms or entrepreneurs: innovative and non-innovative ones. Innovative 
firms invest in the first period afraction  of their output on R+D. If this investment is successful 
in producing a new technology, which occurs with a probability  (with , it induces a 
jump in productivity. More precisely, technology  
produced by R+D, and given by a parameter . Normalising the very first period technology 
to , the quality of the period 1 technology employed by innovative entrepreneurs of 
generation  is given by , where  denotes the number of innovations that have occurred. 
Thus, in this model, denotes not only the generation number but also  technology level. In this 
way, in the first period ( ) of each generation  there are two levels of technology used in the 
economy:  is the technology used by innovative firms whereas non-innovative firms use an 
older technology .
13
 In the second period , innovative firms that have been successful 
in their R+D investment, use a technology , with ; innovative firms that have not been 
successful keep using technology , and non-innovative firms remain with their obsolete 
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 Following Aghion and Howitt (2001), there is perfect complementary between and . This means 
that individuals decide over consumption independently of time and of previous decisions; i.e. 
intertemporal valuation is only considered through .  
11
 It is assumed that only high school and college education have an opportunity cost of studying given by 
the forgone wage in the labour market.  
12
 For simplicity, it is assumed that human capital cannot be obtained through learning-by-doing, nor via 
spillover effects between firms. 
13
 In the very first period of life of this economy, non-innovative firms use technology . 
 8 
technology ; that is, in the second period there are three technology levels. Also note that 
because of the normalization used, each technology level can always be expressed in terms of 
 times the corresponding  factor. The production technology is given by a linear function in 
all cases, which is described below.
14
 
Each worker is randomly matched one-to-one with an entrepreneur both in period 1 and period 2 
of their lives. However, in period 2, if they are matched with a non-i novative firm, they 
experience a skill-loss, represented by a parameter , with : workers with high 
education are matched with firms that need less human abilities. 
15
 The lower is parameter , the 
higher is the skill- oss, or -effect. This effect is not present in the first period because workers 
only count with the inherited human capital level. 
In this way, the production function of non-innovative ( ) firms is given by: 
  for     (2.3a) 
  for     (2.3b) 
N skill-  In turn, the production function of innovative ()
firms is given by 
  for     (2.4a) 
and, in the second period: 
  for     with probability  (2.4b) 
  for     with probability  (2.4c) 
 
From previous equations and assuming there are  non-innovative firms and 
 
innovative 
ones, the overall production level in each period is given by: 
     (2.5a) 
     (2.5b) 
The level of production is higher the higher the proportion of innovative firms in each period. 
Additionally, in the second period, the level of production is higher the lower the -effect (with 
no human capital oss occurring when ), and the higher the probability of investments in 
R+D being successful.  
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 This is in line with an AK model (Aghion and Howitt, 2001) 
15
 The model does not consider unskilled work. 
 9 
Individual workers can obtain wage in period 1 which is a fraction  of the technology per unit of 
human capital (the other  is obtained by the firm). This wage will depend on whether they 
are employed by an innovative or a non-in ovative firm, and this is a random process with 
probability given by the proportion of each kind of firms in the economy.  
The  fraction of workers who are employed in a non-innovative firm, have a wage given by: 
    (2.6a) 
whereas the  fraction of workers who are employed in a innovative firm, have wage given 
by  
        (2.6a) 
This wage is the opportunity cost of studying, and clearly it is higher for those workers who are 
lucky to be employed in an innovative firm. In period 2, workers are again matched with either an 
innovative firm or a non-innovative one, and it is assumed that this allocation is independent of 
their previous employment.
16
 Following equations (2.6), the expected wage can be obtained as a 
time discounted -fraction of the possible technologies considering the probability  of 
innovative firms being a successful in their innovations, as well as the probability  of the worker 
being matched to a non-innovative firm (vs. a probability being   of being matched with 
an innovative firm).  
     (2.7)
17
 
The intertemporal budget constraint is different for workers that are initially employed in a non-
innovative firm from those who are initially employed in an innovative firm. Each of these budget 
constraints is given by: 
    (2.8a) 
    (2.8b) 
Putting things together, individuals will make their decisions about the amount of time  devoted 
to study maximizing the expected discounted lifetime income, which can be obtained replacing 
(2.2) and the corresponding versions of equations (2.6) and equation (2.7), on the right hand side 
of the corresponding expression (2.8), depending on whether they are employed by a non-
innovative or an innovative firm in their first period of life: 
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 A priori, this seems a strong assumption, but it may not be so if as it evidenced later- one considers that 
workers employed in innovative firms in the first period have lower incentives to invest time in education 
for their second period of life. 
17
 Note that, for convenience, the equation is expressed in terms of  technology, considering that 
innovative firms employ  technology if they are unsuccessful, and   technology if 
they are successful. 
 10 
For workers who are employed by a non-innovative firm in their first period of life, their 
optimization problem is given by: 
    (2.9a) 
For workers who are employed by an innovative firm in their first period of life, their 
optimization problem is given by: 
    (2.9b) 
 
The first order condition of both versions of equation (2.9) yields the optimal fraction of time in 
the first period devoted to human capital accumulation. For workers who are employed by a non-
innovative firm in their first period of life, this fraction is given by 
     (2.10a) 
In turn, for workers who are employed by an innovative firm in their first period of life, this 
fraction is given by 
     (2.10b) 
Given that  and  are the proportion of time devoted to study by workers, both expression 
(2.10a) and (2.10b) must be bounded between 0 and 1, otherwise it would be unfeasible. It can be 
seen that for any given set of parameter values,  exactly in ; that is, workers 
who are employed in the innovative firms in the first period of time will invest a lower fraction of 
their time in studying, which is intuitive, as they have a higher opportunity cost of tudying in the 
first period given by their higher wage. The higher the technological jump of each innovation (), 
the bigger wage difference between innovative and non-i novative firms, and thus, the lower the 
time allocated to study by workers employed in innovative firms as compared with workers 
employed in non-innovative ones.   
 
It is also worth noting that in general both equation (2.10a) and (2.10b) show that the time 
devoted to study is an increasing function of the probability of innovating successfully , the 
proportion of innovative firms in the economy, and the efficiency of the educational system . 
Additionally,  is higher the higher the value ofparameter , that is, the lower is the human 






As stated above, there are innovative and non-innovative firms or entrepreneurs and it has been 
assumed that there are  non-innovative firms, and  innovative firms. But what makes a 
firm become innovative?; i.e. what can make fraction  increase? Their decision is based 
on comparing the benefit of being innovative with the b nefit of being non-innovative, and this is 
also influenced by the amount of time their workers spent studying. In ovative firms have a 
benefit given by the following expression, in which firms consider the time allocated to work by 
their employed workers (  in the first period and given that employment in the second 
period of life is independent of employment in the first period it incorporates the expected 
human capital investment of all workers for the second period: 
      (2.11a) 
In turn, non-innovative firms stay producing with the old technology. As before, their benefit 
considers the time allocated to work by their employed workers (  in the first period, and 
incorporates the xpected human capital investment of all workers for the second period: 
      (2.11b) 
 
. Such condition holds when the following condition is satisfied: 
 
This can be re-expressed as: 
  (2.12) 
 
This is a more complex condition than the one On the right hand side of 
nt in R+D times the time devoted to work in 
higher technological step these firms use. For firms to become innovative and be willing to 
invest in R+D, this cost needs to be exceeded by the left hand side of the expression. The first 
term of the left hand side is the gap between time devoted to study by workers employed in non-
innovative firms and time devoted to study by workers mployed in innovative firms. Although 
 12 
, given that  is augmented by the higher technological step  innovative firms use, this 
term is likely to be negative. The key term is thus the discounted value (of the probability of 
success in R&D (  times the technologic , times the expected increase in 
human ca  
 
a favorable 
decision to innovate is more likely to occur the less the future is discounted (i.e. the higher is , 
the higher the probability of success in investing in R+D ( , the higher the size of quality jumps 
in the technology ( , the higher the education productivity parameter , and the higher the 
elasticity of human capital increase to time spent in education .  
 
heir human capital 
accumulation. 
(firms and workers) will be taken depending on what they expect the other part to do. In this 
actors: their initial employment (differing from 
by an innovative firm in their second period 
of life and if so, whether the firm will be successful in its innovation. In turn, firms consider how 
much time workers will decide to devote to study to increase their human capital and to which 
worker they will be matched.  
 
equilibriums may be generated simultaneous ) is 
satisfied: workers expect firms to successfully invest in R+D and to be employed in one of them 
and thus they invest more time studying, 
capital, and t  the condition 
(2.12) is not satisfied: workers do not expect firms to invest, or they do not expect them to be 
successful, or they do not expect to be lucky to be employed in one of the innovative firms in 
their second period of life and thus allocate small amounts of time to increase their human capital. 
Moreover, workers have a lower incentive to invest in studying when they are employed in 
innovative firms in their first period, somehow creating a paradox, as this choice of time 
allocation reduces the incentives of firms to become innovative. In turn, when firms do not expect 
 13 
workers to invest sufficiently in human capital, they do not find incentives to invest in R+D.
18
 It 
is also worth noting that while in (2.12) the -effect does not play a direct role, it plays an indirect 
role via the decision of workers on the time spent studying, which is analysed below. 
 
2.1 The influence of the -effect on the possible equilibriums 
As stated ab ression (2.12). 
and a 
entrepreneurs and workers about each other, as well as on the different parameters of the 
economy. ion is given by expressions (2.10a) or (2.10b), depending on 
whether the worker has been employed in a non-i novative or an innovative firm in the first 
period. Considering these expressions one can evaluate the influence that introducing firms 
heterogeneity and the associated -effect has on the decision to invest in human capital and thus 
on the satisfaction of the condition for firms to become innovative, expression (2.12). Table 1 
summarises the four possible cases under different parameter values of the economy that workers 
may expect. 
 
Table 1: Optimal amount of time devoted to human capital accumulation under different 
parameter values  
 
Suppose workers expect that there will be no successful innovations, that is,  (first row of 
the table). Within this pessimistic case, one may think of two possibilities: 1) all firms are 
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 Redding (1996) offers a detailed description of the possible equilibria configurations. This is left for 
future work the analogous analysis. 
 All innovative firms and absence of human 
capital loss 
,  
Some non-innovative firms (heterogeneous firms) and 









  (2.14a) 









   
(2.16a)   
   
   (2.16b) 
 
 14 
innovative ( ) and thus there is no -effect, 2) firms are heterogeneous ( ) and thus 
there is a -effect. In the first case, when all firms are innovative, despite not being succesful in 
their innovations, there is no effective human capital loss, and the time spent studying is given by 
equation (2.13) in Table 1. This coincides with the amount of time devoted to study by workers 
when firms do not innovate in Redding  model (th . In the second 
case, when some firms are non-innovative, there are two expressions for the time devoted to 
study, one for workers who are employed by non-innovative firms in the first period ( ), and 
another for workers who are employed by innovative firms in the first period ( ). In the case of 
the  , given by expression (2.14a), the difference with equation (2.13) is given by the term: 
. Given that , and the other parameters of this term are lower than 1, it can 
be verified that . That is, the time devoted to study by workers that are employed in 
non-innovative firms in the first period is higher when firms are heterogeneous than when firms 
are all innovative, despite the fact that workers factor in the potential skill-loss they may 
experience (the -effect) if they are employed in a non-i novative firm in their second period. 
The intuition is that their opportunity cost for investing in human c pital is lower than when all 
firms are innovative, and the potential payoff for becoming employed in an innovative firm in the 
second period is attractive enough to invest (even when they consider innovations not to be 
successful), somehow compensating the potential -effect. However, the opposite occurs for 
workers who are employed in innovative firms in their first period of life; it can be verified that 
. For them, the opportunity cost of investing in human capital is higher, they expect no 
successful innovations, and factoring in the potential -effect reduces their incentive to devote 
time to study. The ultimate aggregate value of  will depend on the proportion of each type of 
firm  and . And thus a paradox emerges: the higher t proportion of non-innovative 
firms , the higher the proportion of workers who will invest more in their human capital, and 
thus the more likely is that the condition for a firm to become innovative (condition 2.12) holds. 
Yet as the proportion of innovative firms increases, more workers will tend to invest less in 
human capital as they are paid higher salaries in their first period anyway and firms will have 
lower incentives to become innovative. In this way, firms heterogeneity seems to reinforce 




Now suppose that workers expect some innovations to be successful, that is when . Again, 
there are two possibilities, depending on whether e are heterogeneous firms, and thus a -
 15 
effect) or not. When all firms are innovative, the time devoted to study is given by (2.15) in Table 
1, the  case, which coincides with Redding devoted to study when firms 
innovate. In turn, when firms are heterogeneous, as before, there are two expressions for the time 
devoted to study: one for workers who are employed by non-i novative firms in the first period 
( ) (expression 2.16a), and another for workers who are employed by innovative firms in the 
first period ( ) (expression 2.16b). For an analogous reasoning to the one above, one can verify 
that . In words, in presence of heterogeneous firms, workers employed in non-
innovative firms in the first period of life will invest more in human capital than when all firms 
are innovative, yet, in the same heterogeneous context, workers employed in innovative firms in 
the first period will invest less amount of time in studying than when all firms are homogeneous 
and innovative. As before, the opportunity cost of studying for workers employed in innovative 
firms in their first period of life is higher, plus there is the potential -effect if they end up 
employed in a non-innovative firm in their second period of life. As in the case of no successful 
innovations, the ultimate aggregate value of  will depend on the proportion each type of firm  
and , and again  a higher proportion of innovative firms actually discourages becoming 
innovative. 
period, and the -effect reduces the likelihood of occurrence of a good equilibrium. Moreover and 
paradoxically, the higher the proportion of innovative firms in the first period of life of each 
generation, has an adverse effect on increasing such proportion. Looking in a different way at 
these results, in an economy with marked differences among firms (innovative and non-
innovative), if workers ignore the -effect assuming or believing that all firms are the same, th y 
will  all devote the same amount of time to studying  or  and this will  lead more likely to a 
good equilibrium with firms becoming innovative. But with successful innovations, workers who 
are unfortunately matched with non-i novative firms in the second period of life will notice the 
wage differential in the second period and this will lead future generations to factor-in the -effect 
in their expected salary equation, which in turn will lead future generations to allocate differential 
amounts of time to study depending on their first work experience leading to a more uncertain 
equilibrium. 
 
Relatedly, empirical evidence suggests that in Latin America secondary school drop out is still a 
significant problem, given by the high opportunity cost and the low probabilities of getting an 
employment in the more dynamic industries (Carlson 2002). Additionally, UNESCO (2013) 
states that while secondary education has expanded in Latin America between 2003 and 2013 
 16 
(reaching 77% in 2011), it has done so at a lower speed than over the previous decade. The same 
report indicates that countries that implemented a cash transfer program conditioned on attending 
school were able to increase enrolment much faster than countries which did not introduced such 
kind of programs, supporting the relevance of the opportunity cost in the decision-maki g of time 
devoted to study.  such as problem 
solving, the ones that are vital for adapting to different working contexts, and these are acquired 
mostly at upper secondary level, in which the region is still far from universal enrolment. 
 
3 Simple growth model II: the -effect as a source of a low-development trap 
This model is based on Berti Ceroni (2001) and has been proposed by Santos (2011). It is a 
poverty trap model with two sources: the initial unequal distribution of human capital and 
income, and the differences in the quality of education received by the children of parents with a 
higher educational level and the children of parents with a lower educational level. This 
difference in the quality of education makes that given two children with the same level of 
investment in years of education, they may end up with very different cognitive skills. That is 
why this called a potential human capital loss, or, for brevity, the -effect. The difference with 
Berti Ceroni (2001) in that here the quality of education s introduced as a key determinant of the 
poverty trap. While Berti Ceroni arrives to a two simultaneous and stable equilibriums, one good 
and one bad; here there are three simultaneous and stable equilibriums, two bad and one good.  
 
As in the case of Berti Ceroni (2001), but differing form the previous model, this is a model of 
overlapping generations. Each family is composed of two individuals, father and son. Each 
individual is born with the same ability, lives two periods and is endowed with one unit of time in 
each period. Individuals can make decisions only in the second period of their lives. When young, 
individuals can get education if their parents decide to do so. In that case, they assign their unit of 
time to school. Departing form the previous model, in this case, the unit of time assigned to 
education is indivisible. Children that do not go to school acquire a fixed level of human capital 
as a consequence of the passage of time. In the second period of their lives all individuals offer 
their time unit in the labor market, earn an income that is proportional to their lev l of human 




The utility function of parent i in time t  depends on consumption in period t  and on the stock of 
human capital of the ith child in period 1t . It takes the form: 
1 1( , ) ln( )
i i i i i
t t t tU c h c h   (3.1) 
where  is a parameter that measures the altruistic motive, with 0 1. This utility function is 
the same than the one used by Berti Ceroni. The human capital production function presents the 
fi
between families with more educated parents and families with less educated parents. This 
segmentation is a usually observed characteristic, especially in developing countries and it can be 
seen in terms of social circles or networks (rich people are usually linked to other rich people 
while poor people have friends and family that are usually also poor), and even neighborhoods. 
Superscript j denotes the social circle. 
1
ln[ ( ) ]
j ij j
ij t




q e b v s e b
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with ln( )
j j jv s . 
 
ij
th 1  is the level of human capital that the son of father i, from social circle j will acquire. 
j
 is 
the level of human capital that the child gets if he does not receive any formal education. This 
level varies with the social sector to which the father belongs to. It is assumed that, given two 
fathers, one with a higher educational level than the other, , if none of the fathers 
decides to provide formal education to their children, the son of the better educated father (
2i
th ) 
will enjoy a level of human capital equal or greater than the level of human capital of the son of 
the less educated father (
1i




 depends on 
jv  and js , where jv  
represents the knowledge and basic abilities provided at home, and it is assumed that for 
, 
1 2v v . In turn, js  represents the socio-economic environment in which the family 
lives. It is plausible to assume that when children grow up in better educated social networks, 
they enjoy positive externalities. The exchange with educated adults and children whose parents 
have high education reinforces the knowledge and skills they learn both at school and at home. 
Formally, this parameter moves upwards the whole human capital production function. As before, 
it is assumed that for , 















Education is public; However, there 
exists a private cost of education
ij
te , given by the cost of complementary goods uch as books 
and transportation to school, and by the opportunity cost of non-working. This cost is assumed to 
be 
jb  is a parameter which depends on 
the social circle to which the child belongs to. It is the threshold of spending in education that is 
spending level at which spending in education starts to be effective. As before, for , 
1 2b b . This implies that the minimum level of education (and so the minimum educational 
spending) that the children of better educated parents require so that an improvement in their 
education is observed, is higher than the minimum required by the children of less educated 
parents. 
Finally, 
jq  represents the quality of education that the child belonging to social sector j receives. 
This parameter is of particular interest in the model, since it constitutes one of the causes of low-
development traps. The quality of education that the child receives is not a decision variable for 
the father. It is determined by the allocation of public resources to each school. It is assumed that 
for , 
1 2q q . This implies that schools with students coming from better educated 
families have better quality of education than schools with students coming from less educated 
families. 
 
one only final good through a linear 







ttt dhhghHY )(  (3.3) 
where tH  is the aggregate stock of human capital in period t and )(
i
tt hg  is the density function 
that characterizes the distribution of human capital among fathers in period t, such that 





tt dhhg 1)( . The distribution of human capital in the initial generation of 
fathers is exogenously given: )( 00
ihg , with 0 ( , )
ih   y 1 . 
 
The individual maximization program that father i has to solve in time t is given by: 
max ij
te
  1 1( , ) ln( )
ij ij ij ij ij










s.t                                                                        (4.4) 
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Following Behrman and Birdsall (1983), it is assumed that school quality can not be influenced 
consider taxes. Replacing the budget constraint and the human capital production function in the 
utility function and maximizing with respect to 
ij
te , the expression of optimal spending in 
education is given by: 
* ( )
(1 ) (1 )
j ij j
t
ij ij ij j j
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  (3.6) 
Note that, for human capital levels equal to or lower than the threshold 
jh , the education 
spending function is constant at 
jb , the minimum required level of spending such that the human 
capital of children starts to increase. For human capital levels over the threshold 
jh , the 
proportion of income assigned to education is increasing in the educational level of the father. 
This is because the utility function is non-homothetic. This is analogous to Berti Ceroni (2001). 
jh , at which education 
spending starts to be increasing, is increasing in 
jb  and in jv , and decreasing in the quality of 
education 
jq   . 
 
Replacing (3.5) in (3.2), the transition equation that describes the evolution of dinasty i
capital can be obtained: 
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Under the mentioned assumptions regarding the parameters, the dynamics of human capital 
accumulation of each dynasty is independent of the aggregate dynamic, but it is dependent of the 
social circle j to which the dynasty belongs. This transition function ( )j ijth  has a positive slope 
and is concave for 
ij
t jh h .  
 




1( ) [ ( )] [ , ]
ij ij ij
t t t t tg h g h h  (3.8) 
3.1 Multiple equilibra and poverty traps 
Assume there are only two social circles or sectors, with initial educational levels clearly 
differenced: , with 
1 2i i
t th h .  
 
Santos (2007) specifies a set of plausible conditions so that the aggregate transition function 
exhibits multiple equilibra. These conditions can be summarized in the following four ones: 
C1) ( , , , ) (0,0,0,0)
j j j jv b s q .  
 
C2) 










  1,2j   
 
C4) 0 (1 )[ln( ) ] 1
j j jv b s   1,2j  
 
 
Graph 1 presents one possible set of values of the parameters satisfying the mentioned conditions 
and producing multiple equilibra for each j-transition function.
19
 Each individual transition 
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 values used in the graph are: 




1 1( )ith  (Transition Fc. j=1) and 
2 2( )ith   (Transition Fc. j=2), shows three steady 
states, at human capital levels 
1 1 *, ,u Lh h  y 
2 2 *, ,u Hh h  correspondingly. The equilibra at human 
capital levels 
1
uh  and 
2
uh  are unstable. The other two equilibra of each j- urve are stable.  
While each of the two j-transition function presents three equilibra, the equilibra that will prevail 
at the aggregate level will depend on the interval of human capital levels in which the  




th ) operates, and the interval in which the the 2j  




th ). In other words, the number and type of 
equilibra that are determined in the economy depend on the human capital level that distinguishes 
between the two social circles, the more and the less educated. This threshold is called , and it 




Two additional conditions are necessary to allow the configuration of equilibra that interest to 
analyze in this paper.
20




This condition requires that the human capital level with which the children of better educated 
parents end up if they do not receive formal education (
2 2i
te b ) is lower than the human capital 
level that the  children of less educated parents get if they receive formal education. Sec dly, it 
is required that: 
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Transition Fc. j=2 Aggregate Transition Fc.





Together with the previous conditions, this condition guarantees the existence of three stable 
equilibra at the aggregate level. This can be observed in Graph 1. T e red curve is the aggregate 
transition function: for human capital levels lower than the threshold ( ), the human 
capital accumulation function that prevails is the one corresponding to 1j ; 
capital levels at or above the threshold ( th h), the human capital accumulation function that 
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It can be seen that the aggregate transition function has a discontinuity at the threshold level h . It 
can also be seen that this aggregate transition function defines three stable equilibriums at 
1 * *, ,L Hh h , and an unstable one at 
1
uh .  
 
Dynasties with an initial human capital below  tend, in the long run, to a steady state level of  
human capital given by 
1
, staying forever below the level . It is possible that the fathers of 
those dynasties initially invest to educate their children (with an spending level higher than the 
required threshold, 
1 1i
te b ), but eventually they will stop doing so because the human capital 
stock decreases from one generation to the other. This result is completely analogous to the first 
Dynasties whose initial human capital is above 
1
uh  
but below , tend in the long run to a steady state human capital level equal to . The fathers 
of those dynasties invest enough in their children education (
1 1i









converges to the mentioned steady state.
21
 Finally, dynasties with an initial human capital above
h , converge in the long run, to he steady state human capital level
*
Hh .  
 
In this way, in the long run, dynasties are concentrated in three groups (and not in two as in Berti 
Ceron the very poor, who in the long run do not invest in human capital 
above the required threshold and stay poor and without education; (2) the poor, who are able to 
invest in education and reach an income and human capital level higher than the very poor. 
However, given that they move in a low-education social circle and that they receive low-quality 
education, the human capital level to which they eventually converge is considerably lower than 
that reached by the non poor. This is the -effect, because if these people had had high quality 
education they would have reached the highest steady state equilibrium, with the highest human 
capital level; (3) the non-poor, who start with high human capital levels and their dynasties 
converge to a high steady state level of income and human capital, in part because of their 
favorable initial conditions, but also because they receive high quality education. 
 
The first equilibrium constitutes a clear poverty trap. The second one also represents a poverty 
trap because although the level of human capital and income is higher than in the first 
equilibrium, the dynasties that reach the second equilibrium will never be able to reach the level 
*
Hh , only accessed by those who start with favorable conditions, belonging to the highly educated 
social circle. 
3.2 Aggregate output in the equilibrium 
From the three long run equilibra to which different fractions of the society converge, it is 
possible to obtain the aggregate long run output. 
 
As in Berti Ceroni (2001), at any point in time, income distribution determines current aggregate 
investment in education and aggregate human capital and income of the next period. 
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It is worth noting that there are dynasties that st rt with a human capital level than 
*
Lh  (but lower thanh ) 
and still they end up in the steady state human capital level 
*
Lh , ower than the initial level. 
